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RACE, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES IN
CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION
Pamela S. Karlan*
Once upon a time, back before the Warren Court, criminal pro
cedure and racial justice were adjacent hinterlands in constitutional
law's empire. In 1954, the fifth edition of Dowling's constitutional
law casebook contained one chapter on "procedural due process"
in which six of the eight cases were about criminal justice,1 and
three of those
Powell v. Alabama,2 Moore v. Dempsey, 3 and
-

Bailey

v.

Alabama4

-

were as much about race as they were about

crime. A few pages later, two slender chapters on the "national
protection of civil rights" and "equal protection of the laws" con
tained seven and nine decisions, respectively, a substantial number
of which were criminal cases.5 By 1965, the seventh edition of
Dowling and Gunther contained a dramatically expanded chapter
on "procedural rights in the administration of criminal justice."6
Questions of civil rights and equal protection now appeared, not
only in the section on individual rights, but also in the earlier, more
prominently placed discussion of governmental power.7 But by

1975, in the ninth edition of Gunther, while civil rights issues were
at the forefront of the discussion of governmental power, criminal
procedure had disappeared entirely. As the preface explained,
"[w]hat was once the fate of administrative law .. . has now become
* Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. B.A. 1980, M.A. 1984, J.D. 1984, Yale. - Ed.
I presented an earlier version of this paper at a conference on criminal law and procedure at
the University of Vrrginia School of Law and benefited greatly from the comments of the
other participants. As always with my work in criminal procedure, Bill Stuntz, David
Sklansky, and Danny Richman were incredibly helpful and intellectually generous col
leagues. Johanna Schneider and Bruce Itchkawitz provided valuable research assistance.

1.

NOEL T.

DOWLING,

CASES ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW

659-748 (5th ed. 1954).

2. 287 U.S. 45 (1932) ("Scottsboro Boys" case).
3. 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (aftermath of the Elaine, Arkansas, race riots).
4. 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (peonage case).
5. See DOWLING, supra note 1, at 1115-89 and 1189-1241. The criminal cases were Screws
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (police brutality against a black citizen); United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (vote fraud); the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (violation
of public accommodation statutes); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) Gury discrimina
tion); and Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) Gury discrimination).
6. N oEL T. DoWLING & GERALD GUNTHER, CASES
TIONAL LAW 761-832 (7th ed. 1965).
7.

See id. at 303-31.
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appropriate for the constitutional requirements of criminal proce
dure. "8 Although Powell, Moore, and Bailey remain in the table of
cases, their text is long gone.
The coincident expatriation of criminal procedure and apotheo
sis of equal protection tracked developments in the Court's juris
prudence. Today, the Court's segregation of criminal justice issues
from more general racial issues plays out in the strikingly different
equal protection claims the courts face in the civil and criminal are
nas. The major noncriminal equal protection claims on the docket
today center on affirmative action:

how far can the political

branches go in providing benefits to racial minorities?9 Claims of
discrimination against minorities are usually raised under more
plaintiff-friendly statutory standards.10 At the same time, the major
equal protection claims in the criminal justice system concern
whether the government continues to discriminate in the old
fashioned way against racial minorities: in police practices, charg
ing decisions, sentencing, or the very definition and classification of
criminal offenses.
Although the Supreme Court's initial forays into criminal proce
dure surely had been motivated in large part by concern with the
racial unfairness of southern criminal justice, the Court developed a
series of formally race-neutral rules for constraining police, prose
cutors, and the courts. Even when the Court addressed racial ques
tions directly,

it deployed a

set of analytic and

regulatory

techniques - such as the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section
requirement or the exclusionary rule - that were distinctive to the
criminal justice process rather than using the Equal Protection
Clause.
Starting about ten years ago, however, after roughly a quarter
century of autonomous development, the Supreme Court returned
to the question of how the Equal Protection Clause regulates crimi
nal justice. In Batson

v.

Kentucky, 11 the Court applied standard

doctrinal analysis to the question whether prosecutors could use
8. GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at xx {9th ed.
1975).
9. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (redistricting); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952
{1996) (redistricting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 {1995) {federal
contracting).
10. Both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2{k){l){A) (1994), which forbids discrimination in government employment, and § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994), which forbids discrimination
in voting and redistricting, use disparate impact standards that relieve plaintiffs of the burden
of proving a racially discriminatory purpose.
11. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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their peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the basis of race. In

McCleskey

v.

Kemp, 12 the Court applied standard doctrinal analysis

to the question whether Georgia administered its death penalty in a
racially discriminatory manner. Virtually no one (with the possible
exception of Lewis Powell, who wrote the majority opinions) was
satisfied with the results and reasoning in both cases.
In 1996, the Court confronted another pair of cases raising the
question of how to deal with racial discrimination in the criminal
justice process. In Whren v. United States, 13 the Court addressed
the question of police motivation under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court held that as long as the police have probable cause to
believe that a motorist has violated a minor traffic regulation, they
can stop his car, even if their subjective motivation for the stop is to
investigate a nonvehicular crime for which they lack the requisite
probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The Court acknowledged
that there might be a danger of racially discriminatory pretextual
stops. And it agreed that if the police stopped only black motorists
it would violate the Constitution: "But the constitutional basis for
objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the
Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amend
ment analysis."14
A month earlier, in United States v. Armstrong,15 the Court had
illustrated exactly how slender a constitutional basis the Equal
Protection Clause might provide. There, the Court held that a de
fendant is not entitled to any discovery regarding a claim of racially
selective prosecution unless he first makes a threshold showing that
the government has declined to prosecute similarly situated sus
pects of other races. The Court explained that "the requirements
for a selective-prosecution claim draw on 'ordinary equal protection
standards,"' including the "similarly situated" requirement.16 Bur
ied in a footnote was a provocative question. Suppose a black de
fendant were to show that similarly situated white defendants had
not been prosecuted. Suppose he were even able to show that this
was because of a prosecutor's racist sentiments. What then? "We
have never determined," the Court observed, "whether dismissal of
the indictment, or some other sanction, is the proper remedy if a
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

481 U.S. 279 {1987).
517 U.S. 806 (1996).
517 U.S. at 813.
517 U.S. 456 (1996).
517 U.S. at 465, 466.
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court determines that a defendant has been the victim of prosecu
tion on the basis of his race."17
This footnote captures the ambivalence of the Court in trying to
articulate remedies for equal protection violations in the criminal
procedure context. The four conventional remedies for violations
of criminal procedure protections have been exclusion of evidence;
reversal of convictions (which normally permits retrial); dismissal of
indictments in egregious cases; and separate civil damages actions.
Whren and Armstrong raise the possibility that the first and third of
these remedies, exclusion and dismissal, will be unavailable for
claims of racial discrimination. And the second, reversal, is often
unavailing, at least for claims of racial discrimination in the selec
tion of suspects or defendants, where the constitutional violations
occur outside the trial process itself; in these cases, the problem is
not with the defendant's trial, but with his being brought to trial in
the first place. Moreover, our experience over the last decade with

Batson claims - where reversal and retrial has been the standard
remedy - suggests that here, too, traditional criminal procedure
remedies do not translate easily into the equal protection context.
Finally, the fourth remedy, damages, while theoretically available,
is often foreclosed as a practical matter, given the fact that the vic
tims of racial discrimination in the criminal process are often un
sympathetic plaintiffs.
The goal of this article is to explore the complications that arise
in the definition of rights and in the operation of remedies when the
Equal Protection Clause is used in criminal adjudication. I begin by
explaining why the apparently minor doctrinal move in Whren from
the Fourth Amendment to the Equal Protection Clause has impor
tant consequences. In particular, it raises the question whether the
exclusionary rule remains an available remedy for police miscon
duct. I argue that the exclusionary rule, a traditional criminal pro
cedure

remedy,

may

often

be superior

to

traditional equal

protection remedies for remedying equal protection violations in
the criminal procedure context. Here, I apply well-developed argu
ments about the relative benefits of the exclusionary rule to the
race-discrimination context. The most plausible alternative to using
the exclusionary rule to influence police behavior is to use

§ 1983

lawsuits,18 either for damages or injunctive relief, but these may be
17. 517 U.S. at 461 n.2.
18. 42 U. S C. § 1983 (1994). For a general overview of § 1983 litigation, see PETER W.
Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., Crvn. RIGHTS ACTIONS: SECTION 1983 AND RELATED
STATUTES (2d ed. 1994).
.
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inadequate tools. I then tum to Batson claims. Here, my argument
focuses on the converse problem: the remedies are too effective
and courts have responded to the stringency of the remedial scheme
by implicitly restricting the underlying right. General criminal pro
cedure doctrine led the courts to a rule of per se reversal for Batson
violations. Because this rule may be substantially overinclusive requiring reversal in cases where the exclusion of particular jurors is
unlikely to have affected the outcome - courts have strained not to
find a violation in the first place. Finally, I consider the problem of
selective prosecution. I suggest that Armstrong and McCleskey de
ploy what the Court calls "traditional equal protection principles"
essentially to strip the concept of selective prosecution of virtually
any real-world effect: they define away the right and the remedy
simultaneously.
I.

THE EXCLUSION OF EXCLUSION?

One of the arguments raised by the petitioners in Whren was
that permitting the police "to use traffic stops as a means of investi
gating other law violations, as to which no probable cause or even
articulable suspicion exists" posed a serious threat of racial discrim
ination.19 Whren's fear turns out to be well foup.ded. There is a
voluminous scholarly and popular literature on the phenomenon of
"Driving While Black" - the propensity of police to stop a dispro
portionate number of minority motorists who are acting no differ
ently than their white counterparts who are not pulled over.20 The
most widely discussed examples involve the too-aptly named "Se
lective Enforcement Team" of the Volusia County, Florida, sheriff's
office21 and the Maryland State Police.22 An Orlando Sentinel in
vestigation found that although the vast majority of drivers on In19. Wbren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
20. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 425
(1997); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 546-47 (1997); Sean
Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops:. An Expanded Role for Civilian Review Boards, 28
CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 551, 551 (1997); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment,
51 V AND. L. REv. 333 (1998); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the
Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REv. 271.
21. For more detailed discussions of the Volusia County experience, see, for example,
Harris, supra note 20, at 561-63; Hecker, supra note 20, at 559-60; and Jeff Brazil & Steve
Berry, Color of Driver is Key to Stops in 1-95 Videos, ORLAND O SENTINEL, Aug. 23, 1992, at
Al.

22. For more detailed discussions of the Maryland State Police case, see, for example,
Davis, supra note 20, at 431, 438-42; Harris, supra note 20, at 563-66; Hecker, supra note 20,
at 561-63; Maclin, supra note 20, at 349-52; and Catherine M. Brennan, Court Calls for Closer
Look at Police Records: Case Illustrates Legal Difficulties Wrought by Use of Race
Stereotypes, BALTIMORE DAILY REcoRD, Apr. 14, 1997, at lA.
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terstate 95 in Volusia County were white, almost seventy percent of
the motorists stopped were black or Hispanic.23 In light of the fact
that only nine of the over one thousand drivers stopped were ever
given traffic tickets, that only fifty-five drivers were arrested for
some other offense,24 and that only 15.1% of the drivers convicted
of traffic offenses in Florida were black,25 there is a strong argu
ment that the traffic stops were pretextual in two distinct senses:
first, the police were stopping the cars not for traffic violations but
to investigate unrelated crime; second, they were choosing which
cars to stop at least in part on the basis of race. Similarly, data from
Maryland showed that 73 % of drivers stopped by the State Police
were black - indeed, two of the twelve officers patrolling the rele
vant stretch of Interstate 95 stopped only black motorists - despite
the fact that only 17.5% of the motorists who appeared to have
violated traffic laws were black.26
Under circumstances like these, the inference that race plays

some role in enforcement decisionmaking is overwhelming. First,
there is substantial evidence that many departments use statistical
profiles in which race is a factor,27 even if there are a dozen other
factors - including, of course, violation of some traffic law. Sec
ond, the fact that such a small proportion of drivers who violate the
traffic laws are stopped, but that such a substantial proportion of
the drivers who are stopped are black - and that the proportion of
drivers stopped who are black greatly exceeds their presence
among drivers generally - strongly suggests that similarly situated
white drivers are being treated differently. Indeed, the nature of
the substantive law virtually guarantees a level of discretion that
fosters arbitrary, and perhaps discriminatory, enforcement. It is
likely that virtually every driver is violating some aspect of the rele
vant motor vehicle code: one of the provisions of the relevant Dis
trict of Columbia regulations mentioned in Whren requires, for
example, that a driver "give full time and attention to the operation
of the vehicle."28 Thus, the likelihood that virtually every driver is
violating the law means both that the police have probable cause to
23.

See Brazil & Berry, supra note 21, at AlO.
24. See id.
25. See Harris, supra note 20, at 562.
26. See Brennan, supra note 22.
27. See Davis, supra note 20, at 429-30; Harris, supra note 20, at 568-69; Sklansky, supra
note 20, at 278 n.38.
28. Whren, 517 U.S at 810 (quoting D.C. MUN. REos. tit. 18, § 2213.4 {1995)). See also
Sklansky, supra note 20, at 298-99 (pointing out that "the police, if they are patient, can

eventually pull over anyone they are interested in questioning").
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stop nearly everyone and that they won't engage in anything like
full enforcement.
Under conventional equal protection doctrine, police practices
like those I just described would stand a good chance of being held
unconstitutional. A black driver who had been pulled over would

stand a good chance of showing that race was "a motivating fac
tor"29 in the government's decision to stop him. Under the

Arlington Heights test, that is all he would need to demonstrate in
order to shift the burden to the government defendant to show that
it would have acted identically "even had the impermissible pur
pose not been considered" at all.30 He would not be required to
prove that race was the "sole," "primary," or "dominant" factor in
order to make out a prima facie case of unconstitutionality.31
Moreover, many police departments would be unable to meet their
burden of rebuttal. Given the minuscule number of motorists even motorists who are violating some traffic ordinance - that
they stop, and the relatively slight risk white drivers face of being
pulled over, it might be very difficult for the defendants to show
that they would have pulled over any particular minority motorist
had they ignored race entirely. And to the extent that one accepts
the quite plausible idea that nonwhites are targeted for discrimina
tory enforcement at least in part because they have less political
control over the police than the majority community enjoys,32 the
problem may be even worse: if the police could not use race, or
other indicia of political marginality in deciding whom to pull over
for essentially innocuous offenses (and just as importantly, whom to
question more extensively), they might either abandon pretext
stops altogether or so reduce their use that the likelihood of any
particular minority driver being stopped would be lower still.
Even under the arguably more stringent burden plaintiffs face in
selective prosecution cases - a topic mentioned above and to
which I return in Part lll33 - these types of claims might well sur
vive. In an interesting twist, the very incentive Whren creates for
29. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 {1977) (emphasis added).
30. 429 U.S. at 271 n.21.
31.

See 429 U.S. at 265.

32. Cf. Sklansky, supra note 20, at 324 (suggesting that "victims of police abuse typically
belong to groups with minimal political clout"); William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains,
Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 553 {1992) (suggesting that
the potential for political control over police discretion plays a large part in public willingness
to permit expansive statutes).
33.

See infra text accompanying notes 106-34.
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the police to explain their stop in terms of low-level traffic viola
tions makes it far more likely that minority motorists will be able to
point to similarly situated white drivers who were not stopped,34
Moreover, traffic enforcement is particularly amenable to the use of
testers to conduct reverse sting operations,35 as well as to direct ob
servation of police response to black and white criminal behavior to
establish a plaintiff's claim that blacks and whites are treated differ
ently.36 Even if the police do pull over a white tester with a non
working tail light, the chances of actually being ticketed are low,
and the cost of a ticket not particularly prohibitive. By contrast,
using testers in a case like Armstrong37 - where the testers would
presumably have to sell 124 grams of crack to federal informants
while carrying :firearms in order to be similarly situated to the de
fendants - is out of the question: no one in his right mind would
run the risk of being a tester.

In light of the fact that the Equal Protection Clause seems capa
ble of supporting claims of racially discriminatory law enforcement,
why should we care that Whren has allocated these types of claims
to the Fourteenth Amendment rather than to the Fourth? Indeed,
there is a plausible argument to be made that, from a societal per
spective, the Equal Protection Clause is a better doctrinal home for
such claims. Under the rule the Whren petitioners sought, even de
fendants who have no plausible claim of having been the victims of
invidious discrimination - for example, middle-class white drug
smugglers - would be entitled to the suppression of evidence. All
such a defendant would need to show is that the trooper stopped
him, not because of his failure to signal continuously for at least one
hundred feet before turning right on an empty road,38 but because
she suspected - correctly, as it turned out - that he was carrying
drugs. For these people, a Fourth Amendment suppression would
be the purest form of windfall: they would obtain the exclusion of
evidence without actually having been denied any reasonable ex34. That is, minority motorists may find it quite easy to show that there were a substantial
number of white drivers who fit the articulated criteria for being stopped.
35. For general discussions of sting operations and testers, see, for example, ROBERT G.
SCH WEMM, HousING D1scRIMINATION: LAW AND LmGATION § 32.2 (1997); Michael H.
Schill, Local Enforcement of Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in Housing: The New York
City Human Rights Commission, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 991, 997-98 (1996). For an example
of a reverse sting involving traffic stops, see Harris, supra note 20, at 567-68.
36. For examples of such traffic laws, see Brennan,
at 561-66, 568-69; Maclin, supra note 20, at 349-50.

supra note 22; Harris, supra note 20,

37. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 459 (1996).
38. See Harris,
requirements).

supra note 20, at 558 n.82 (collecting statutes with these sorts of
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pectation of privacy, since there was concededly probable cause to
stop them. A Fourteenth Amendment rule, by contrast, forbids
only selectivity that uses illegitimate criteria for winnowing down
the universe of potential detainees.
The problem with the move to the Fourteenth Amendment and the unspoken question in Whren - is not about rights. Every
one agrees that "the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of
the law based on considerations such as race."39 The problem is
about remedies: is there a Fourteenth Amendment exclusionary
rule? Perhaps such a rule would be irrelevant. If, for example, the
proper remedy for a discriminatory traffic stop is to dismiss outright

all charges that are based on evidence acquired during such a stop,
then exclusion would be at most a lesser included remedy of dismis
sal, and defendants would be indifferent as to its existence. But
notice that such a position draws heavily on Fourth Amendment
causation principles: it sees the evidence introduced as fruit of the
poisonous tree,40 namely, the unconstitutional stop. There is not, as
far as I can tell, any directly analogous principle of general constitu
tional law or equal protection doctrine.41 To the extent that dismis
sal is the appropriate remedy for selective law enforcement, a point
to which I return in Part III, the state would be barred from prose
cuting James L. Brown (Whren's codefendant, and the actual
driver) for failure to give full time and attention to the operation of
the vehicle, failure to signal before turning, or driving at a speed
greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions - the
offenses for which the police concededly had probable cause in
Whren42 - if he could establish that the decision on whom to stop
was based on race. But the link to the charges on which he was in
fact prosecuted is a bit more tenuous.43 Suppose, for example, that
39.

Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.

40. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985) (discussing the fruit of the poison
ous tree doctrine); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 801-02 (1984) (same); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (same).
41. See Maclin, supra note 20, at 338 n.22 (stating that the "Court has shown no sign that
it interprets the Equal Protection Clause to embody an exclusionary rule remedy"); cf.
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (upholding a criminal conviction obtained after the
defendant was forcibly kidnapped and brought into the jurisdiction since the actual trial was
conducted fairly).
42.

See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.

43. And the link to the charges on which Michael Whren himself was prosecuted is also
intricate. Whren's arrest was the fruit of the pretextual stop of someone else. See Whren, 517
U.S. at 808-09. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), and its progeny hold that Fourth
Amendment rights cannot be asserted vicariously, that is, that evidence need not be sup
pressed unless the person against whom it is being used was the direct victim of the unreason
able search or seizure. See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CmusToPHER SLOBOGIN,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4.04 (3d ed. 1993). Thus, evidence illegally seized from person A
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the police can show that every time they observe individuals with
the amount of crack that Whren and Brown possessed, they arrest
them. Then the prosecution for drug possession does not itself in
volve "selective enforcement of the law based on considerations
such as race."44 In the context of defending against a criminal pros
ecution, then, it may be very difficult to get away from Fourth
Amendment concepts, even if they are limited to cases where there
is an equal protection violation as well somewhere in the causal
chain.

It is hard, of course, to know whether that limited point was all
that Whren was suggesting: that exclusion of evidence (which will
often be the practical equivalent of outright dismissal) will remain a
remedy if defendants like Whren can show they were stopped at
least in part because they were black. I worry, though, that what
the Court was trying to do by recasting Whren's claim was to elimi
nate the possibility of exclusion because exclusion is only a Fourth
Amendment remedy. As far as I can tell, with the exception of two
New Jersey state court cases that antedate Whren,45 there are no
reported cases in which suppression was the remedy for racially se
lective enforcement. And prior to Whren, the doctrinal handle for
the suppression was the Fourth Amendment: the seizures were un
reasonable because they were unconstitutional (under the Equal
Protection Clause).46
can be used against person B. By analogy, it is questionable whether an unconstitutional stop
of driver A bars prosecution of passenger B. Suppose, for example, that driver A was
stopped solely for an unconstitutional reason - say, because he had supported the sheriff's
opponent in a recent election. Suppose further that, as a result of that stop, A provided
information to the police (or a search of his car revealed such information) without which
they could not have arrested or prosecuted person B, not a passenger in the car. Surely B
would be unable to suppress that evidence. On the other hand, suppose that one of the
reasons the police stopped A's car was because of B's race. Cf. Papachristou v. Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156, 158-59 (1972) (suggesting the police stopped a car because of the mixed race of
its occupants). Then B would be the direct victim of an equal protection violation, since the
police would have acted in part on the basis of his race. In Whren, the fact that the police
officers' "suspicions were aroused". when they passed a truck with "youthful occupants
the driver looking down into the lap of the passenger," 517 U.S. at 808 (emphasis added),
might therefore give Whren as well as Brown standing.
•

44. Whren,

•

.

511 U.S. at 813.

45. See State v. Kennedy, 588 A.2d 834, 838-39 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (sup
pressing evidence seized as result of discriminatory enforcement of the traffic laws by the
New Jersey State Police under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Four
teenth Amendment); Davis, supra note 20, at 436 n.83 (describing State v. Soto, Superior
Court of New Jersey (unpublished opinion, Mar. 4, 1996)); Hecker, supra note 20, at 563-64
(same); Maclin, supra note 20, at 346-49 (also discussing Soto).
46. Cf. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973) (explaining that searches of book
stores might be umeasonable, and thus unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, if
they rise to the level of unconstitutional prior restraints under the Fust Amendment).
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My concern with eliminating suppression as a remedy for ra
cially selective prosecution or law enforcement stems from the role
suppression plays in fully vindicating individuals' rights �gainst po
lice misconduct.47 Consider the differing incentives the victims of
discriminatory police stops have to litigate. Most victims of dis
criminatory police stops or other investigative activity are "innocent
victims" - individuals who were stopped but ultimately not con
victed of any offense. They are unlikely to bring suit.48 It may be
that they are unaware of their rights when they are stopped and
further, because they have no automatic access to lawyers, as crimi
nal defendants would,49 they may remain unaware. This will be es
pecially true if they suffered dignitary injuries but not physical ones.
It is hardly an accident that the most vigorously litigated challenge
to discriminatory police enforcement has as its lead plaintiff a black
D.C. public defender who was well aware of his rights and the pos
sibility of legal action from the outset.50 "Guilty victims" - indi
viduals who were stopped and ultimately convicted - have varying
incentives to litigate depending on the particular remedy afforded
them. Civil damages and injunctive relief offer guilty victims little
incentive to litigate their claims of racial discrimination, while sup
pression offers a powerful incentive.
Guilty victims are especially likely to find the civil damages pro
cess rough sledding. Juries are generally unsympathetic to

§ 1983

plaintiffs who complain about searches that in fact uncovered evi
dence used to convict them.51 This is particularly true if there was
47. For general discussions of the importance of exclusion and the inadequacy of civil
damages remedies, see, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conserva
tive Critics: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 591 (1990); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REv. 820 (1994) [hereinafter Steiker, Second Thoughts].
48. See Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 1456, 1482 {1996).
49. The Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel applies only in criminal proceed
ings. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 {1981).
50. The Maryland State Police case is discussed supra, text accompanying notes 22 and
26, and infra, text accompanying notes 56-58.
51. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Casper et al., The Tort Remedy in Search and Seizure Cases: A
Case Study in Juror Decision Making, 13 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 279 (1988). The case study
reviewed the empirical literature and concluded that police officers prevailed about three
quarters of the time and that, when plaintiffs won, the damages awarded were relatively
minor (e.g., about a third of the plaintiffs who won received less than $1000, and 85% re
ceived less than $10,000). See id. at 283. A simulation showed that denying jurors informa
tion about the outcome of the search - i.e., not telling jurors whether the allegedly illegal
search uncovered evidence of crime - was the factor most likely to increase both the inci
dence and the size of damages awards. See id. at 298-300; Dripps, supra note 47, at 629
(noting that between 1971 and 1986, plaintiffs filed 12,000 Bivens actions but in only five did
the defendants actually pay damages and identifying "two obvious reasons for the failure of
civil plaintiffs to enforce the fourth amendment: first, juries sympathize with the police and
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nothing wrong with the way the search itself was conducted. As
William Stuntz explains, hindsight is always a problem in suppres
sion cases,s2 but it is likely to be exacerbated here by the different
decisionmaker:

in a suppression case, a judge decides whether

there has been an equal protection violation; in a civil damages
case, the finder of fact will be a jury. Precisely because the victims
of discriminatory enforcement are members of racial minorities,
often minorities who are physical outsiders to the community where
they were stopped, juries may find empathy harder in these cases
than in conventional

§ 1983 police misconduct cases.

Nor is it likely that equal protection can be vindicated through
suits for injunctive relief. City of Los Angeles v. Lyonss3 held that a
plaintiff who is seeking an injunction must show a likelihood that he
will again be injured by the unconstitutional practice he challenges.
The danger must be plaintiff-specific: it is not enough to show that
someone will likely be injured by future conduct.S4 Moreover,
Lyons demanded restraint in issuing injunctions against state law
enforcement in the absence of a showing that there is a substantial
risk of irreparable injury.ss A lawsuit challenging discriminatory
traffic stops might confront difficulties under each of these aspects
of Lyons. It may be quite difficult for a particular plaintiff to show
a likelihood that he personally will be stopped again for a discrimi
natory reason. And if no one plaintiff can show a likelihood of be
ing unconstitutionally stopped again, then a class action is equally
unavailing, since it does not permit inadequate individual claims to
be aggregated to meet the imminent-injury requirement. At the
same time, courts may also be unwilling to find that the injury from
an illegal stop is irreparable even if it does involve a mostly intangi
ble dignitary injury. One of the most interesting aspects of the ac
counts of the civil litigation challenging discriminatory enforcement
activity is that Lyons never seems to have been considered.
n ot with criminals; second, search an d seizure activity, however uncon stitutional, ordinarily
does not cause the kind of actual damages that our tort system compen sates" (citing OFF. OF
LEGAL PoL ., U.S. DEPT. oF JuSTicE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JusncE SYSTEMS, REPORT No. 2,
REPORT TO THE ATIORNEY GENERAL ON THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
40-41 (1986))); Alison Patterson, Note, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ls
Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 767-802 (1993) (describin g the
variety of difficulties with usin g § 1983 as a method of deterring police misconduct).
52. See Wtlliam J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REv.
881, 912-13 (1991) [hereinafter Stuntz, Fourth Amendment Remedies]; see also Steiker,
Second Thoughts, supra note 47, at 852-53 (discussing the hindsight problem).
53. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
54.

See 461 U.S. at 105-06.

55.

See 461 U.S. at 111-12.
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Moreover, precisely because much of the enforcement activity
goes unrecorded and discretion in any event remains so prevalent in
police enforcement decisions, injunctions may have little effect. In
this regard, consider the Maryland experience. As a result of
Robert Wilkens's suit against the Maryland State Police, the police
agreed not to use race in setting policy "for stopping, detaining, or
searching motorists traveling on Maryland roadways."56 They also
agreed to keep records including racial data regarding all cases in
which drug-sniffing dogs were used or motorists consented to fur
ther searches. The results are not encouraging for the prospect of
policing the police injunctively:
Of the 732 citizens detained and searched by the Maryland State
Police [between January 1995 and June 1996], 75% were African
Americans, and 5% were Hispanics. The Maryland numbers are also
broken down by officer; of the twelve officers involved, six stopped
over 80% African-Americans, one stopped over 95% African
Americans, and two stopped only African-Americans.57

Earlier this year, the judge who is monitoring the settlement re
quired the police to start keeping data regarding all stops along In
terstate 95. She held that the plaintiff "had made a 'reasonable
showing' that a continuing pattern of discrimination exists."58
But if injunctions are unavailable and damages are likely to be
small, suppression is left as the only effective remedy. Suppression
creates a powerful reason for a criminal defendant to litigate an
equal protection challenge vigorously: the very cases in which such
a violation is most likely to have occurred are also those in which
suppression is most likely to lead to dismissal or acquittal.59 Fur
ther, suppression not only alters the incentives of the victim to liti
gate, it also alters the incentives of the police to engage in the
behavior in the first place.
Under the Whren "Fourth Amendment pretext" hypothesis, the
only reason the police stop drivers for otherwise unenforced traffic
violations is to seek information on unrelated crimes. Making it
impossible to use such information only in cases where there is a
Fourteenth Amendment pretext problem as well should eliminate
the incentives to engage in dual-pretext stops. No evidence will be
suppressed - even if it is the result of a Fourth Amendment
56. See Davis, supra note 20, at 440; Brennan, supra note 22, at 1.
57. Harris, supra note 20, at 566.
58. Brennan, supra note 22, at 18A.
59. That is, if the defendant gets seized evidence suppressed in those cases in which selec
tive prosecution occurs - usually low-level offenses or victimless crimes - there is unlikely
to be other evidence to support a conviction.
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pretextual search - if the police engage in a nondiscriminatory pat
tern of pretextual searches. Thus, suppression becomes a pointed
remedy for the equal protection violation. We should therefore be
troubled if the major effect of the move from regulating the police
under the Fourth Amendment to regulating them under the Equal
Protection Clause is to exclude the exclusionary rule as a remedial
strategy.
II.

THE REVERSAL OF REVERSAL?

Jury selection offers another arena in which actors within the
criminal justice system (here, attorneys) are tempted to use race as
a shorthand for predicting the behavior of individuals (here, mem
bers of the venire) about whom they otherwise know very little.
And here, too, the Court has ultimately turned to the Equal Protec
tion Clause rather than a criminal procedure-specific provision the fair cross-section requirement embodied in the Sixth Amend
ment's guarantee to "the accused" of an "impartial jury"60 - to
prevent discrimination on the basis of race.
As with the question of pretextual searches, one motive for the
Court's initial resort in Batson

v.

Kentucky61 to the Equal Protec

tion Clause might have been a desire to limit the degree of judicial
intrusion into discretionary government decisionmaking. Had the
Court relied on the criminal procedure-specific Sixth Amendment
instead of the Fourteenth Amendment to police peremptory chal
lenges, this might have expanded the number of criteria that were
out of bounds. For example, daily wage earners62 and persons op
posed to the death penalty63 are cognizable classes under the fair
cross-section requirement but are not suspect classes for equal pro
tection purposes. In addition, although this ultimately turned out
not to matter, defendants were permitted to bring Sixth Amend
ment challenges on behalf of groups of which they were not mem
bers,64 while the Fourteenth Amendment right had been exercised
60. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment fair cross-section and impartiality
requirements apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend
ment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
61. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
62. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
63. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
64. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (involving male defendant who
challenged exclusion of women from jury pool).
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largely by defendants who were themselves members of the ex
cluded groups.65
Tue past decade's experience with the enforcement of Batson,
however, reveals a problem similar to the one posed by Whren:
namely, the difficulties that arise when we use the criminal adjudi
cation process to vindicate equal protection rights that extend be
yond those of criminal defendants. Tue suppression of evidence
and a consequent dismissal of charges provides some defendants
with a windfall - especially when the value for them of avoiding
criminal punishment exceeds the value to them of the underlying
legitimate privacy interest. So, too, the reversal of a conviction pro
vides some defendants with a windfall - especially if they would
have been convicted regardless of the composition of the jury.
Courts responded to the windfall problem in the search and seizure
context with what Carol Steiker calls "inclusionary" rules designed
to calibrate more finely the remedial structure of Fourth Amend
ment law.66 What Batson shows is that when courts cannot cali
brate the remedy, they fudge on the right instead.
Tue Batson cases raised a question absent from the selective en
forcement cases: who is the victim when a juror is peremptorily
struck because of her race or sex? Here, the Court has been some
what circumspect. Over the past decade, the Court has moved to
ward the view that the victim in Batson cases is the excluded
juror.67 If the state excludes someone from jury service on the basis
of race or sex, it has denied her equal protection of the laws just as
it would have done had it told her that she could not hold some
other position within the state government or could not frequent
some other public facility. And once Batson was extended to reach
a defense counsel's use of peremptory challenges,68 the juror, or the
public at large, necessarily had to be seen as the victim since the
exclusion was the defendant's act.
65. But see Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 498 (1972) (holding, in a habeas case brought by a
white petitioner, that the exclusion of blacks from juries violated the petitioner's due process
rights). Peters v. Kiffwas decided before the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment.
66. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MlcH. L. REv. 2466, 2469 (1996) (explaining that inclusionary
rules permit the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence or uphold convictions based on
improperly admitted evidence) [hereinafter Steiker, Counter-Revolution] .
67. See, e.g., Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Represen
tation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93 (1996); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending
Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 725
(1992).

68. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
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The movement toward a juror-centered view of the Batson right
was tempting in part because it enabled the Court to finesse the
question whether the race or sex of a jury's members affects trial
outcomes.69 The Court has always been extremely cagey about this
issue. On the one hand, particularly in the fair cross-section cases,
the Court has suggested that race and sex matter both because they
might influence individual jurors' perspectives and because the be
havior of a jury as a whole might be affected by its racial and sexual
composition.70 On the other hand, the Court has been equally in
sistent that stereotypical assumptions about jurors' attitudes are
both unjustified and unjusti:fiable.71 It is wrong in both the descrip
tive and the prescriptive sense to assume that jurors will vote differ
ently because of their race or sex. Jurors of all races and genders
can be equally impartial and qualified.

If the injured party is the excluded juror, the Court does not
need to resolve this issue. The injury occurs, and is complete, when
the peremptory strike is exercised on an impermissible ground. It is
irrelevant how, or even whether, it affects the outcome of the de
fendant's trial. But if the injured party is the defendant, then we
really do need some theory of how he has been injured. The least
complicated account, which works well enough for defendants who
are of the same race as the excluded juror, focuses on stigmatic in
jury: striking members of the defendant's group sends the message
that the state views the group as unworthy of participating fully in
the criminal justice process.72 The defendant, in this view, is simply
a particularly close observer of this "expressive harm."73
But the stigmatic account is unsatisfying because it is incom
plete. The apparent prevalence of race-based peremptory chal
lenges suggests that a large number of experienced participants in
criminal trials believe that the race of jurors can affect the outcome
of a criminal trial, and that taking race into account improves, at
least marginally, the ability to predict a juror's position. Especially
69. This question is discussed extensively in Muller, supra note 67, at 97-107.
70. See, e.g., Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531; Peters, 407 U.S. at 503; Ballard v. United States, 329
U.S. 187, 193 (1946).
71. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 138-40 & n.11 (1994); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991).
72. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 86; Strander v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
73. The view that racial classification perpetrates an expressive, or "non·instrumental,"
injury has recently emerged as a central piece of equal protection law, particularly in the area
of voting rights. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein, Identifying the Harm
in Racial Gerrymandering Claims, 1 MrCH. J. RACE & L. 47, 65 (1996); Richard H. Pildes &
Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating
Election-District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mrctt. L. REv. 483 (1993).
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when it comes to defendants who are of a different race than the
excluded juror - and who therefore do not share directly in any
group-based stigma that exclusion might express - it must be, as a
pragmatic matter, that they are injured, if at all, because excluding
members of a protected class somehow increases the likelihood of
conviction.

Why, after all, would most white defendants care

whether any blacks served on their juries unless they believed that
black and white jurors either would vote differently or that a ra
cially mixed jury would be more pro-defendant? In either case,
race

matters.

Those justices

- like Justices

Kennedy

and

O'Connor - who generally take a colorblind perspective in other
areas of equal protection law like voting rights and affirmative ac
tion74 are thus particularly hamstrung when it comes to Batson
claims.
The switch toward a juror-centered understanding of the Batson
right avoids having to answer one hard question only to raise an
other. Assuming that all of the jurors who actually served were im
partial and thus that the defendant was convicted by an impartial
jury,75 what is the basis for allowing a defendant to challenge his
conviction on the ground that some potential jurors were improp
erly removed?
One way of thinking about this question is to locate it in the
broader debate in constitutional criminal procedure over which er
rors should be subject to harmless error analysis and which should
require per se reversal.76

In the Court's current taxonomy for

thinking about this problem, there are two types of constitutional
infirmities: trial errors and structural defects. Trial error involves
mistakes - such as the admission of illegally obtained evidence that occur during the presentation of a case to the jury.77 Trial er
rors are subject to harmless error analysis. Because they are dis
crete, performing the harmless error inquiry involves an intelligible
task: the reviewing court asks whether, in the context of the entire
74. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-12 (1995) (racial gerrymandering);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (affirmative action); Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (voting rights).
75. In Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 183-84 (1986), the Court asserted that as long as
each juror who serves is himself or herself impartial, the jury as a whole is impartial, regard
less of its composition.
76. For a summary of recent developments, see Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, But
Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1167,
1176-78 (1995); Muller, supra note 67, at 107-16.

77. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 307-08 (1991).
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record, tlie error might have made a difference.78 For example, if
the case against a defendant is overwhelming - say his fingerprints
were found on the scene and he made incriminating statements af
ter receiving Miranda warnings - then the introduction of an ille
gally seized piece of evidence might conceivably be viewed as
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. If, however, the case is closer
- because there is no other physical evidence and the defendant's
post arrest statements were quite ambiguous - then a reviewing
court might be uncertain as to whether the illegally seized evidence
might have tipped the balance toward conviction.
Structural defects, by contrast, require per se reversal.79 These
sorts of errors so taint the framework within which a trial proceeds
that, in an important sense, there has been no trial. One way of
thinking about the handful of errors the Court has identified as
structural - the denial of counsel or the right of self-representa
tion, the use of a biased judge, the exclusion of the public, and the
"exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand jury"80
- is to see that in each case, one of the indispensable actors in the
criminal process is, at least constructively, missing. It requires too
much imaginative reconstruction by an appellate court to ask
whether, if the defendant had had a lawyer, the outcome would
have been the same. Yale Kamisar's classic article about Betts v.
Brady81 illustrates precisely how unjustifiable such a counterfactual
inquiry would be.82
Despite the recent spread of harmless error doctrine throughout
constitutional criminal procedure, the federal courts that have con
sidered the question have generally treated Batson violations as
structural and thus subject to per se reversal.83 As a doctrinal mat78. See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281; Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08.
79. See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280; Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309.
80. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986));
see also Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281 {deficient reasonable-doubt instruction is never harmless);
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46-47 (1984) (denial of right to public trial is never harmless);
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984) {denial of right to self-representation is never
harmless); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 {1963) (denial of counsel is never harm
less); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 {1927) {biased judge is never harmless).
81. 316 U.S. 455 {1942).
82. Yale Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due
Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REv. 219 (1962).
83. See, e.g., Ford v. Norris, 67 F.3d 162, 170-71 (8th Cir. 1995); Rosa v. Peters, 36 F.3d
625, 634 n.17 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1261 {9th Cir. 1987).
For an argument that even per se reversal does not provide a sufficient deterrent to
Batson violations, and that the correct remedy should be dismissal of the prosecution with
prejudice, see Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discrimi
natory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1099, 1116-23 {1994).
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ter, this makes a certain degree of sense. The closest analogues to

Batson violations are the racial exclusion of potential grand jurors84
and the exclusion of the public from a defendant's trial85 - both of
which are grounds for per se reversal. Moreover, the Supreme
Court's unwillingness to hypothesize about how jurors' race and sex
affect their deliberations makes it difficult to see how reviewing
courts would perform the "quantitativ[e] assess[ment]"S6 harmless
error review would demand. Performing harmless error in Batson
cases would require asking whether the evidence was overwhelm
ing; whether one could imagine jurors of different races or genders
reacting to the evidence differently; what the racial composition of
the jury actually seated was; and so on. These questions are pre
cisely the ones the Supreme

Court has

repeatedly

avoided

answering.
The adoption of per se reversal, though, is obviously not socially
costless: some defendants will have their convictions reversed de
spite the fact that we can be certain, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that they would have been convicted even had there been no equal
protection violation. Consider, for example, a white defendant,
convicted on the basis of overwhelming evidence, by a racially
mixed jury, for a crime that had no readily discernible racial angles.
If the prosecutor struck a single black venire member on the basis
of race, this would be an equal protection violation.87 A reviewing
court might be hard pressed to see how the exclusion of that partic
ular juror conceivably affected the outcome. Of course, the court
could point to the metaphysical strand of the jury selection cases the juror's absence deprived the jury of some unknown and un
knowable "flavor"88 - but that seems a slender reed on which to
be worried that "[t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to
84. See Hillery, 474 U.S. at 264.
85. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 46-47.
86. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281; Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308.
87. See United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir. 1987); cf. Albert W.
Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Vair Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Re
view ofJury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. RE.v. 153, 170-73 (1989) (discussing the varying positions
courts have taken on this question). Indeed, some state courts that have treated some Batson
violations as harmless have pointed to the presence of some blacks on the jury as a factor
tending to make any violation harmless. See, e.g., State v. Vmcent, 755 S.W.2d 400, 403-04
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988). The more co=on move, as the text suggests, is simply not to find a
violation as long as the government has left some blacks in the pool. See Alschuler, supra, at
171 n.79 (collecting such cases).
88. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946) ("To insulate the courtroom
from either [sex by excluding its members from the jury] may not in a given case make an
iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded.").
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end [was] obviously affected,"89 the explanation given for what con
stitutes a structural error.

If we focus on the rights of excluded jurors - who may be una
ware that they were struck for invidious reasons - or the interest
of the public at large in the overall racial fairness of the criminal
justice process, we might view any windfall to the defendant as a
necessary byproduct of fully vindicating these third parties' claims.
The prospect of per se reversal might provide a necessary induce
ment for defendants to press every violation of an excluded juror's
rights. Moreover, precisely because per se reversal lessens the
"hindsight problem" - by precluding reviewing courts from relying
unconsciously on the fact that the defendant was convicted in as
sessing his claim9° - it is also more likely to deter Batson violations
in the first place. Finally, if Batson is fundamentally about potential
jurors' equal protection rights, there is no reason to ask whether
exclusion affected the outcome of a defendant's trial. The injury
was complete the moment the juror was struck. In this view, the
error cannot be rendered harmless by the overwhelming guilt of the
defendant.
But once we move toward viewing the right given to the defend
ant in these instrumental terms, the temptation arises to balance
more finely the competing public interests in equal protection and
in prosecution of crime. Consider how the Court has treated a simi
In Stone v.
Powell, 91 the Court concluded that the interest in deterring illegal

lar problem in the Fourth Amendment context.

searches and seizures of innocent third parties could be adequately
vindicated by allowing defendants to litigate Fourth Amendment
claims only up to a point. Defendants can seek the suppression of
evidence at trial and on direct appeal, but they cannot raise Fourth
Amendment claims on collateral review.92
Initially, the Supreme Court imposed a similar sort of limit on

Batson claims: it refused to apply Batson retroactively to claims on
habeas.93 But the lower courts have been engaged in a more inter
esting, and less candid, response to the social costs posed by full
enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause. Rather than limiting
89. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10.
90. For discussions of the hindsight problem, see Steiker, Second Thoughts, supra note 47,
at 852-53; Stuntz, Fourth Amendment Remedies, supra note 52, at 912-15.
91. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
92. See 428 U.S. at 492-94.
93. See Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986); see also Muller, supra note 67, at 128 (dis
cussing how Allen v. Hardy illuminates the paradoxical question of what actually constitutes
a Batson injury).
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the remedy, they have surreptitiously redefined the right. In es
sence, they have responded to the fact that many Batson violations
might be found harmless if harmless error analysis were performed
by declining to find a violation in the first place.
Lower courts have accomplished this by combining a deferential
standard of appellate review94 with a sweeping scope of permissible
neutral explanations for prosecutorial strikes.95 The list of nonra
cial explanations that courts have found sufficient to negate an in
ference of racially selective strikes includes jurors' clothing
(including, for example, wearing a Malcolm X hat),96 membership
in a non-mainstream religion, handwriting,97 weight,98 occupation,99
parental and marital status,100 "attitude,"101 and so on. The fact
that there is no requirement that there be any discernible connec
tion whatsoever between the neutral reason, which often is corre
lated to some degree with race, and some feature of the case102
gives prosecutors a virtually limitless inventory of reasons. More
94. See, e.g., United States v. Valley, 928 F.2d 130, 135 (5th Cir. 1991) (describing the
deferential standard of review). One empirical study looked at 76 cases in which defendants
had persuaded trial courts to require prosecutors to explain their peremptory strikes. In only
three of the cases did the app eals court find that the proffered reasons were pretextual and
reverse the convictions. See Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson's Invidious Legacy: Discrimina
tory Juror Exclusion and the "Intuitive" Peremptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 336, 358
(1993).
95. For three extensive empirical examinations of Batson challenges, see Kenneth J.
Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Chal
lenges, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 447 (1996); Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky,
Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
229 (1993); Swift, supra note 94. Melilli's data showed that prosecutors succeeded in provid
ing an acceptable race-neutral explanation roughly 80% of the time that judges even required
them to offer one. Melilli, supra, at 461. For a critical perspective on the entire enterprise of
Batson enforcement, see Ogletree, supra note 83.
96.

See United States v. Hinton, 94 F.3d 396, 396 (7th Cir. 1996).

97. See Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (finding neutral the
decision to remove a juror because he belonged to the Church of Christ, "which [the prosecu
tor] regarded as a religious preference that was 'a little bit away from the main stream,"' and
his handwriting was not very legible).
98. See, e.g., Galbert v. Merkle, No. C95-4065, 1997 WL 85012 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1997)
(finding youth and obesity to be sufficiently race-neutral factors to justify the p rosecutor's
removal of all three black venire members).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarado-Sandoval, 997 F.2d 491, 491-92 (8th Cir. 1993)
(finding explanation sufficient when prosecutor struck juror because she was a "cosmetolo
gist" and "I am going to get i nto an aiding and abetting type theory and just for whatever
reason I did not want a cosmetologist"); Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 95, at 240-45
(collecting cases).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Williams , 934 F.2d 847, 849 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding expla
nation sufficient when excluded juror was a single mother who "might have other concerns");
Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 95, at 258-60 (collecting cases).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 52 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1995); Palmer v. Lares,
42 F.3d 975, 980 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 95, at 246-49
(collecting cases).
102.

See Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 95, at 273-74; Swift, supra note 94, at 364-65.
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importantly, appellate courts give great deference to a trial judge's
conclusion that the prosecutor's explanations sufficiently met his
burden of going forward.

It is at least conceivable that appellate courts would be less
credulous if they were asked in the abstract whether such reasons
really seemed a more plausible explanation than the use of race for
a series of racially correlated strikes. But they are not asked this
question in the abstract: rather, it is presented to them in the pos
ture of an appeal from a conviction.103 While it is too massive a
task to read and code all of the thousands of appellate cases making
Batson claims - and virtually no Batson decisions at the trial court
level are reported - I have a hunch that Batson operates on some
thing rather like a sliding scale.

In racially charged cases, trial

judges are less likely to accept, and appellate courts are less likely
to affirm, implausible explanations for racially correlated strikes.1o4
By contrast, in cases without an obvious racial salience, trial judges
may view Batson objections as attempts to set up grounds for per se
reversal and thus may accept somewhat dubious prosecutorial ex
planations; similarly, if the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, a re
viewing court is more likely to affirm the trial judge's decision on a

Batson claim.
But this disingenuousness has its dangers. First, courts may un
derestimate, either systematically or in particular kinds of cases, the
relevance of a juror's race to his or her assessment of the evidence.
They may not think, for example, that cases where the credibility of
police witnesses is at issue are racially charged regardless of the
particular facts; it might, however, be the case that there is in fact a
deep racial divide on this issue.105 Ironically, then, there may be
cases where the racial composition of the jury is outcome
determinative, or at least outcome-affective, that end up getting af103. The denial of a Batson challenge cannot be appealed interlocutorily. Thus, the only
cases appellate courts see are those in which the defendant has been convicted on at least
some count.
104. See, e.g., Gamble v. State, 357 S.E.2d 792 (Ga. 1987). Gamble involved a black-on
white capital murder case in which most of the state's witnesses were white and most of the
defense witnesses were black. 357 S.E.2d at 795. The prosecutor used all his peremptory
strikes to remove potential black jurors and he removed all the potential black jurors. The
Georgia Supreme Court found that the prosecutor's reasons for striking various black venire
persons were "suspect under Batson," even though these reasons - age, church membership,
attitude, occupations - often seem to satisfy reviewing courts.
105. See Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race in Juror Impartiality and Venue Transfer, 53
MD. L. REv. 107 (1994) (suggesting racial differences may well affect juror decisionmaking
on a range of issues); Nancy J. King, Post-Conviction Review of Jury Discrimination:
Measuring the Effects ofJuror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MrCH. L. REv. 63, 88 n.92 (1993)
(collecting studies).
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firmed. But the existing structure of Batson argumentation pro
vides no occasion for making this sort of claim: it does not readily
allow for the argument that, given the facts of this particular case,
an otherwise-acceptable reason ought to be reviewed more
carefully.
Second, the Batson. rule is to a great extent hortatory in the
same way that the ban on selective enforcement is: much of its ef
fectiveness in the real world depends not on judicial enforcement
but on its internalization by the relevant actors. When courts ac
cept dubious justifications for racially correlated strikes, they may
send a message to prosecutors and defense counsel that the exclu
sion of minority jurors is generally not going to be taken very seri
ously or scrutinized very carefully.
ill.

THE DISMISSAL OF DISMISSAL?

The problem of racially selective prosecution reveals why it is so
difficult to "draw on 'ordinary equal protection standards "'106 in the
context of criminal justice. The precise holding in. United States v.

Armstrong is that for a defendant to be given discovery on a claim
that he is the victim of racially selective prosecution, he must make
a threshold showing that the government has declined to prosecute
similarly situated suspects of other races.107 This requirement dove
tails with the showing he will ultimately have to make with regard
to discriminatory effect; in addition, of course, he will have to show
a discriminatory purpose.ms
There are four aspects of Armstrong that distinguish it sharply
from the ordinary equal protection case. The first, which is so obvi
ous that it might easily be overlooked, is that the ordinary equal
protection claim is raised in the course of civil litigation. This pre
supposes the existence of thorough discovery, precisely the process

Armstrong pretermits. In Hunter v. Underwood, 1o9 for example,
one of the cases on which Armstrong relied to illustrate how the
similarly situated requirement operates,11° the court of appeals
noted that although the plaintiffs had made "no showing of discrim
inatory impact" at a hearing on the defendants ' motion to dismiss,
"the allegation, if supported by facts developed in later proceedings,
106. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
107. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469-70.
108. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
109. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
110. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 467.
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states a claim upon which the plaintiffs could recover."111 The
Court in Underwood therefore reversed the district court's dismis
sal of the plaintiffs' claim that the legislature of Alabama had spe
cifically adopted the list o f misdemeanors that result in
disenfranchisement with the intent to bar blacks from voting. The
imposition of what would be called in civil litigation a heightened
pleading requirement for claims of racially selective prosecution112
has no precursor in ordinary equal protection law. The effect of

Armstrong is to immunize from full-scale litigation, at least in the
context of a criminal trial, a claim to which the government would
be required to respond more fully if it involved any state function
other than criminal prosecution.
The second sharp divergence between Armstrong and the
Court's ordinary equal protection analysis involves the sense in
which similarity is to be judged. When it comes to suspect classes,
the Court generally rejects stereotypes whether or not they are
true.113 The very act of stereotyping is constitutionally illegitimate.
So, for example, in the area of legislative redistricting, currently one
of the major equal protection issues on the Court's docket, the
Court has vehemently rejected the proposition that black voters
"think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the
same candidates at the polls" as offensive and demeaning,114 de
spite substantial statistical evidence that shows precisely this level
of political cohesion and pervasive racial bloc voting.115 Similarly,
in United States v. Virginia, 11 6 the Court rejected as constitutionally
irrelevant the argument that "most women" would not seek the ad
versative training that Virginia Military Institute offered.117 By
contrast, when it came to "the presumption that people of all races
commit all types of crimes," and that no "type of crime is the exclu
sive province of any particular racial or ethnic group,"11 8 a perspec111. Underwood v. Hunter, 604 F.2d 367, 370 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
112. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993) (explain
ing that heightened pleading requirements demand plaintiffs allege with specificity, prior to
discovery, facts that tend to prove their claim).
113. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 70809 (1978).
114. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-12 {1995) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
647 {1993)).
115. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 994-95 {1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (dis
cussing the history of racial bloc voting in Dallas County, Texas); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp.
408, 464-65 (E.D.N.C. 1994) {three-judge court) {discussing racial polarization in North
Carolina), revd. on other grounds, 517 U.S. 899 {1996).
116. 518 U.S. 515 {1996).
117. 518 U.S. at 542.
118. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469.
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tive that would at least suggest suspicion of a prosecutorial portfolio
like the one in Armstrong composed entirely of black defendants,
the Court took precisely the opposite tack. Relying on a somewhat
circular set of statistics that showed that more than ninety percent
of the defendants sentenced for crack-related offenses were
black,119 it declared that "[p]resumptions at war with presumably
reliable statistics have no proper place in the analysis of this
issue."120
I cannot think of a single other area of current equal protection
doctrine in which the Court is prepared to assume, based on ambig
uous statistics, that blacks and whites differ in a legally cognizable
way. That the Court adopts such a position here illustrates a
broader point that emerged from the highway stop and jury selec
tion cases as well. Whatever the Court says about its commitment
to ridding the criminal justice process of racial discrimination, it is
in fact quite skeptical that this can be done, at least at an acceptable
social cost. The very nature of the process, at the police and
prosecutorial levels, requires a fair amount of discretion on the part
of a large number of actors and the Court tacitly accepts the level of
disparate impact that discretion seems to produce.121
Third, criminal procedure poses a special problem in thinking
about whether defendants are similarly situated. What precisely
does this mean? That individuals of different races violated identi
cal provisions of the criminal code? That individuals of different
races caused the same harms by violating a particular provision of
the criminal code? That individuals of different races engaged in
different forms of criminal conduct that are similarly morally culpa
ble or socially harmful? As David Sklansky points out in his won
derful Stanford Law Review piece, these choices are shot through

with "'racially selective sympathy and indifference. "'122 And as

119. See Armstrong, 517 U. S. at 469. The statistics are circular b ecause they are exactly
what one would expect if race were in fa ct the explanation for the pattern of prosecutorial
decisions.
120. 517 U. S. at 469-70. Those statistics, of course, m ight also b e used to support
Arm strong' s claim, unless the Court is wedded to the proposition that sentencing rates track
exactly the incidence of crime. For reasons William Stuntz sugg ests, this seems unlikely: the
far more plausible conclusion is that dr ug crime involving black sellers is prosecuted at a
higher rate than similar crime involving whites. See Wi lliam J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and
Drugs, 99 CoLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming Nov. 1998) (manuscript on file with author) [herein
after Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs].
121. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312-13 (1987) (accepting that the opti mal
level of discretion in the criminal j ustice system may necessarily produce some racial
disparities).
122. David S. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN . L. REv. 1283,
1307 (1995) (quoti ng Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense ofthe Antidiscrimination Principle, 90
HARV. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1976)).
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Willi am Stuntz suggests in a forthcoming article, there are good rea
sons for choosing any of these definitions . . . and equally good rea
sons for worrying about them all.123
Ordinary equal protection cases certainly do not pose these
questions nearly as starkly. Indeed, sometimes they do not pose
them at all. Consider again Hunter v. Underwood.124 The provision
at issue there, Article VIII, section 182 of the Alabama Constitu
tion of 1901, disenfranchised, among other persons, individuals con
victed of misdemeanors of moral turpitude.125 Included within that
category were crimes such as presenting a worthless check and
petty larceny; excluded were such apparently more serious crimes
as second-degree manslaughter, assault on a police officer, and
mailing pornography. There was clear evidence that some of the
crimes were included on the list precisely because its drafters
thought they were almost entirely the province of blacks.126 Then
Justice Rehnquist, in a unanimous opinion for the Court, concluded
that section 182 had both a discriminatory purpose and a discrimi
natory effect.127 According to Armstrong, the Court's holding in

Hunter
was consistent with ordinary equal protection principles, including the
similarly situated requirement. There was . . . indisputable evidence
that the state law had a discriminatory effect on blacks as compared
to similarly situated whites: Blacks were by even the most modest
estimates at least 1.7 times as likely as whites to suffer disfranchise
ment under the law in question.128

In what way exactly were blacks and whites "similarly situated"?
Everyone, black and white, who committed the enumerated crimes
was removed from the voting rolls. The plaintiffs in the case, Victor
Underwood (who was white) and Carmen Edwards (who was
black) were each convicted of presenting worthless checks and were
each disenfranchised. Everyone, black or white, who either com
mitted an unlisted crime or who was law-abiding, was permitted to
vote. If blacks who were disenfranchised and whites who were not
disenfranchised were similarly situated, it must have been with re
spect to some metric other than the precise crimes with which they
were charged, since they were charged with different crimes. But
while the Court was willing in Hunter
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

v.

Underwood to treat blacks

See Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, supra note 120.
471 U.S. 222 {1985).
See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 223 n.* (reproducing constitutional provision).
See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 232.
See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 467 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and whites convicted of distinct misdemeanors as similarly situated
for purposes of challenging their disenfranchisement, it is incon
ceivable that the Court would find a constitutionally sufficient dis
criminatory effect if Carmen Edwards had argued that she (and
other blacks) had been prosecuted for passing worthless checks
while the state had declined to prosecute white individuals who had
mailed pornography.

·

The fourth and most critical difference between ordinary equal
protection cases and selective-prosecution cases concerns the claim
ant's objective. With few exceptions, the plaintiffs in the typical
equal protection case seek 'to acquire, rather than to avoid, some
thing: the vote, a job, admission to particular schools. The govern
ment distributes benefits and plaintiffs seek to receive the same
benefits that individuals of other races or the opposite sex receive.
In a selective-prosecution claim, by contrast, the defendant seeks to
avoid a burden the state dispenses.
, The general assumption in contemporary equal protection law,
which seems to play out most of the time, is that faced with a find
ing of unconstitutionality, the state will remedy the inequality by
providing the benefit to the previously excluded group (that is, by
"levelling up") rather than by depriving the previously included
group ("levelling down"). The few examples in ordinary equal pro
tection of levelling down - the' closing of the schools in Prince
Edward County, Virginia,129 or the swimming pools in Jackson,
Mississippi130 - stand out precisely because of their rarity. The
underlying assumption, which ties into Paul Brest's theory that the
Equal Protection Clause is meant to address racially selective sym
pathy or indifference,131 is that the majority provided itself with the
benefit largely because of the intrinsic value of the particular item,
and not out of a desire simply to have something the minority lacks.
The Equal Protection Clause forces the majority to treat the minor
ity the same way it treats itself.
Seen in this light, the Armstrong Court's observation that "[w]e
have never determined whether dismissal of the indictment, or
some other sanction, is the proper remedy if a court detenriines that
a defendant has been the victim of prosecution on the basis of his
race"132 poses several interesting questions. Precisely because pros-

L.

129. See Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
130. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
131. See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv.
REv. 1, 7-8 (1976).
132. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 461 n.2.
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ecution is the converse of most government goods, dismissal is the
epitome of levelling down. As Randall Kennedy has suggested, one
could imagine an equal protection remedy for selective law enforce
ment that levelled up: if the government wants to prosecute people
like Armstrong, it must round up some white crack dealers (or
otherwise similarly situated criminals) and prosecute them too.133
The problem with foreclosing dismissal, and mandating levelling
up as a remedy instead, is that then no one will seek to vindicate the
right: it is hard to imagine the defendant who would bring a selec
tive-prosecution claim if the only available remedy is that his trial
goes forward but someone else of a different race goes to prison as
well. Misery loves company, but not that much. More broadly, it is
unclear what remedies other than dismissal will create an incentive
for defendants to ferret out racial discrimination in the charging
process. Sanctioning the prosecutor does not offer much to the de
fendant. Moreover, precisely because many of the victims of selec
tive prosecution are in fact guilty of the crimes charged, it is hard to
imagine a jury awarding significant damages in an independent

§ 1983 lawsuit. Here, the same problems emerge that I discussed

earlier with respect to damages actions as an alternative to suppres
sion of evidence.134
Interestingly, dismissal

may

in fact

be a relatively

well

calibrated remedy for racially discriminatory prosecution precisely
because of the insight offered by the empathy-forcing understand
ing of equal protection law. The normal assumption in most areas
of criminal procedure is that dismissal provides a windfall for guilty
defendants: they might still have been prosecuted and convicted
even if the error had not occurred. That assumption is weaker in
equal protection cases. It's not, of course, that the defendant didn't
sell crack; he probably did. But if selling crack was a crime only
because the majority believed this was something done mainly by
blacks - in the same way that vagrancy was a disenfranchiseable
offense in Alabama only because the majority thought this was an
exclusively black status - then dismissal offers the defendant no
windfall since in a society that complied with the Equal Protection
Clause, there would not be a separate set of crack offenses. And
notice that precisely to the extent that the majority is willing to ap
ply its laws to itself, the defendant's windfall is quite small: given
the existence of more general drug possession laws that

are

applied

133. See Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp, Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1388, 1436-38 (1988).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
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to white individuals as well, a defendant like Armstrong could be
prosecuted for those offenses. In this sense, dismissal or levelling
down is simply a more efficient way of accomplishing the equaliza
tion process that levelling up might produce in the long run. If the
majority were forced to apply these laws to itself, political pressures
might lead to the laws' modification. The only defendants for
whom dismissal will offer a complete ability to escape prosecution
are those whose acts correspond to no behavior for which the ma
jority punishes its own members. And it is precisely in such circum
stances that we should be most worried about the majority's
decision to punish the minority.
CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the reabsorption of criminal procedure into general
equal protection doctrine will turn out to be far more troubling
than the Supreme Court's breezy statements about "ordinary equal
protection standards" recognize.135 It's not simply the failure of
general equal protection doctrine to perceive racial discrimination
in the criminal justice system, although, as David Sklansky has
shown, courts have been especially "feeble-sighted" in finding con
stitutional violations because the "doctrinal discussion [is] carried
out at too high a level of generality."136 Sometimes - as my dis
cussion of what applying the analysis from Hunter v. Underwood to
the problem of racially selective prosecution might really mean137
- it seems as if, far from being inadequate to the task, applying
general equal protection principles might produce more, rather
than fewer, findings of constitutional violations.
Our problems turn out to be as much about remedies as about
rights. Criminal adjudication's distinctive remedial scheme capital
izes on the complicated relationships among innocent and guilty
suspects, defendants, venire persons, and the public at large, as well
as the complex incentives faced by law enforcement personnel and
prosecutors. General equal protection law, by contrast, generally
assumes enforcement only by individuals "directly" and "person
ally" injured by the government's use of race.138 Moreover, the re135. This problem is not unique to criminal law. As I have argued with regard to another
racially charged area of the law - legislative redistricting - some areas of governmental
decisionmaking raise such distinctive problems that jamming them into standard doctrinal
pigeonholes "is both misguided and incoherent." Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson,
Why Voting ls Different, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1201, 1202 (1996).
136. Sklansky, supra note 122, at 1284.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 124-28.
138. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 (1995).
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medial focus of general equal protection law has been in providing
minority citizens with more of some good that the government pro
vides, while the demand in the criminal context is for less of a set of
costs that the government imposes. Without understanding the dis
tinctive set of remedial challenges posed in the context of criminal
adjudication, it is simply impossible to confront, let alone to solve,
the persistent problems of race and criminal justice.

